The excessive violence that has spread across virtually all of Syria since the 2011 uprising against the regime of Bashar al-Assad has so far prevented a serious debate about feasible solutions. Most political factions fear that any talk of a compromise solution will undermine their own position among their followers and benefit the other side by granting it recognition. The opposition refuses to negotiate with a dictator who has too much blood on his hands, while the regime declines to negotiate with "terrorists." Fear of exclusion in a future order dominated by radical Islamist forces is keeping the minority groups and some secularists close to the regime. This vicious circle of repudiation and fear has strengthened threat perceptions and has caused a military stalemate.
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GIGA Working Papers of September 2015, approximately a quarter-million people had been killed, over one million had been injured, four million had fled the country, eight million were internally displaced, and more than twelve million were in need of assistance inside Syria.
The conflict and civil war have dramatically altered relations between the country's many ethnic and sectarian communities. As most protesters and rebels are from the Sunni Arab majority and most members of the Alawite minority and the Christian communities have predominantly stayed close to the regime, the fighting has increasingly overlapped with sectarian stereotypes and acts of ethnic cleansing. Other minorities have often been trapped between regime troops who indiscriminately bomb civilian areas and jihadist militants who discriminate against and assassinate the members of minority groups. The image of a harmonious multicultural society in a united Syrian nation has been deeply scarred, if not obliterated.
This section focuses on the historical relationship between Syria's ethnic-sectarian communities and these communities' relationships with the regime. A special focus is placed on the dissension in the wake of the Arab Spring. In the second section we refer to the programmes and documents of the main opposition groups to evaluate their understanding of the ethnic-sectarian configuration as well as their conceptions of how to deal with this diversity. We also build our analysis on interviews with intellectuals and political and military leaders from the opposition to analyse their perspectives on the option of a power-sharing arrangement, 2 and we discuss two precedent-setting power-sharing arrangements -in the Kurdish province Rojava and in the Syrian town of Qahtāniyya. In Section 3 we outline the Syrian regime's possible reaction to a power-sharing agreement. A brief review of powersharing arrangements in neighbouring Lebanon and Iraq, as well as some other countries, is used to refine our assessment of the Syrian case. In the final section, we suggest practical steps for overcoming the Syrian quagmire and offer some general recommendations for potential power-sharing in the country.
The Syrian population reached approximately 23 million in 2011 and has since dropped by four million due to flight abroad. 3 Syrian society is composed, both demographically and geographically, of overlapping ethnic, religious, and sectarian identity groups. Ethnically it is made up of 85 per cent Arabs (including some 500,000 Palestinians) and 10 per cent Kurds;
other minorities such as the Turkmen, Armenians, Circassians, and Assyrians make up ap- 4 This mosaic of presumably primordial entities is further subdivided due to geography, socio-economic status, rural-urban descent, religious creed and practice, collective memories, and political alignment. All these cleavages have generated both further divisions within the communities and solidarity groups that cross-cut primordial ties.
Historically, the Syrian territories were part of the Ottoman Empire, forming the provinces (wilāyāt) of Aleppo and Damascus, which included the cities of Damascus, Aleppo, Homs, and Hamah, the coastal plains, and the eastern steppes (al-Bādiyya) . Syria is the cradle of several heterodox Christian and Islamic sects, which found refuge in its mountainous areas.
It also became a shelter for several waves of immigrants, such as Armenians, Kurds, and Palestinians, most of whom fled their home countries during the first half of the twentieth century. All this has made Syrian society rich and diverse in terms of its cultural, ethnic, and religious composition.
In the twentieth century, Syria was deprived of parts of its territory -namely, the Sanjak of Alexandretta, which was transferred to Turkey in 1938; Akkār, Tripoli, and the eastern Bekaa In addition to this ethnic-territorial modelling, France conscripted members of the Alawites, Druze, Kurds, and Circassians in a disproportional manner relative to the Sunni Arab majority population, which it mistrusted because of its Arab nationalist aspirations. France bolstered the minorities' presence in the Troupes Spéciales du Levant, an auxiliary force of the French army that later became the nucleus of independent Syria's army (Fildis 2011; Fildis 2012; Neep 2012 They did not feel any political or social obligation to share power with other groups, as they possessed the symbolic capital of the superior "Sunni" religion and "Arab" ethnicity as well as the demographic majority. They also possessed the physical capital through their domi- and his son Bashār al-Assad (since 2000), Syria experienced half a century of political and social rigidity. The regime was secular to a large extent, as stipulated by the constitution of 1973 and the laws it decreed. It did not directly address ethnic-sectarian identities; rather, it depicted diversity -aside from its own folkloristic display -as a threat to and a distortion of its national mission, as delineated in the constitution's preamble:
The Arab nation managed to perform a great role in building human civilization when it was a unified nation. When the ties of its national cohesion weakened, its civilizing role receded and the waves of colonial conquest shattered the Arab nation's unity, occupied its territory, and plundered its resources. (Syrian Constitution 1973) The only ethnic-sectarian provisions mentioned in the constitution concern the president of the republic, whose religion has to be Islam, and legislation. Article 3 states that "Islamic jurisprudence is a main source of legislation." The inclusion of these stipulations was a concession to religious conservatives within the Sunni community, who later challenged Assad's presidency as most Sunni Islamists do not acknowledge Alawites -and therefore the Assadsas Muslims (Kramer 1987 
The Syrian Opposition's Debate on Ethnicity and Power-Sharing
After years of alternating fortunes of war, military escalation, and massive destruction, the more moderate opposition has come closer to the insight that neither party can overcome the other by mere military force, that a continuation of war might bring more risks than opportunities, and that in the end a political solution has to be achieved. However, there are also enduring obstacles to a compromise solution given the deep mistrust between the oppo-279/2015 GIGA Working Papers nents, spoilers who are still striving for military victory, external actors who fuel the tensions, and radical jihadist militias with the agenda of establishing Islamic rule far beyond the Syrian borders.
The Moderate Opposition
The Syrian civil opposition is composed mainly of secular and non-sectarian, socialist, liberal, and nationalist intellectuals, parties, and non-governmental organisations. They were the first to take up the spontaneous initial protests and to convert them into demands, thereby providing the protests with a progressive face. This political discourse clearly dominated during the initial phase of the uprising, until Islamist ideology and sectarian sentiments started to overtake the political domain. Today, this covenant is still considered the basic document of the Syrian revolution, and most civil national parties refer to it. It states that the future Syria should be a democratic and civil state, declaring, "We, the Syrian people, are proud of our cultural mosaic and diver-279/2015 GIGA Working Papers sity of our religious beliefs -Muslim, Christian and others" (Syrian National Council 2012a).
The covenant explicitly honours several ethnic communities, broadening the scope of former programmes and stating that a future constitution "will ensure non-discrimination between any of the religious, ethnic or national components of Syrian society -Arabs, Kurds, Assyrians, Chaldeans, Turkmens or others," with an emphasis on "the unity of Syria's land and people" and the principle of "unity in diversity" (Syrian National Council 2012a). Thus, the covenant defines the Syrian people on the basis of a common territory and a pluralistic, tolerant culture. However, it does not elaborate on how it plans to achieve and guarantee cultural pluralism, especially for the heterodox Islamic communities. The provision that "The new Syrian state will guarantee the protection of individuals and groups and it will work on a nationwide reconciliation process, based on justice and tolerance" (Syrian National Council 2012a) can be interpreted as addressing the Alawite community's fear of collective persecution in case of the Assad regime's collapse.
The largest meeting of the Syrian opposition to date took place in Cairo on 2-3 July 2012.
The "Cairo Documents" agreed upon there consider the transitional phase the most dangerous and list a set of conditions including transitional justice, a fact-finding committee, and a transitional government to carry out the daily functions. The "National Compact," the fundamental document of the Cairo meeting, suggests a new constitution for Syria where
People are the source of legitimacy and sovereignty which are achieved through a democratic, republican, pluralistic, civil system, where law prevails and is based on institutions. Monopolization of power or inheriting it under any form is not allowed.
(Syrian National Council 2012c)
This draft constitution stipulates "the right for fair participation of all ideological and political currents" in elections. The document takes pride in Syria's civil, cultural, and ethnic diversity, stating that "Any citizen has the right to occupy any position in the state, including the post of President of the Republic, regardless of his religion or nationalism either man or woman " (Syrian National Council 2012c). However, it does not contain any power-sharing guarantees for minorities.
The Syrian National Coalition (SNC)
Strong competition among the Council's leaders and the group's lack of influence inside Syria League (AL) in 2013 and the Syrian embassy in Doha, Qatar. Nevertheless, the SNC was not allowed to attend the annual AL assembly in 2014.
In its "Doha Agreement" of 11 November 2012, the SNC states "The Coalition will set up technical and specialized committees" and "form an Interim Government after receiving international recognition" (Syrian National Coalition 2012a; Syrian National Coalition 2012b).
Except regarding its own composition -"The Coalition's Statutes shall make clear each side's proportion of representation" -there is no mention of any power-sharing or minority rights, as the agreement focuses on organisation, not on content. On 12 March 2013, the members of the SNC elected Ghassān Hītū as the prime minister of the provisional government. On 6 April he announced that he would form a government that would take action in the liberated areas of Syria. In November 2013, this government moved its office to Gaziantep, Turkey, to be closer to the Syrian border. It is still headquartered there.
Further Groups and Actors
In many of the programme participants are based in the West, it is still uncertain whether these programmes will be able to effectively influence further developments in Syria.
The field commanders who deserted the Syrian army and joined the rebel militias constitute relevant players in Syria's foreseeable future, as many of them will demand to have a say in politics. Hence, their views concerning power-sharing between popular groups are of special importance for the general Syrian debate. 7 The Syrian regime does not allow its field commanders to express their political views -doing so is restricted to the political leadershipas any violation of consensus might disrupt the functional coherence of its front. Because the conflict started in the peripheral areas, those who deserted were usually from the rural, poor, and mostly illiterate strata of society. Therefore, many of today's armed opposition leaders who deserted the army lack political knowledge, especially regarding a future state order and the distribution of power.
An Evaluation by Syrian Intellectuals
Syrian intellectuals are usually more diverse and differentiated in their argumentation regarding a future order for Syria than the parties who are more dependent on internal compromise and foreign donors. They can more easily formulate political visions without adapting them to tactical considerations. However, there is often a blatant gap between their official statements and the more realistic statements they make in confidential talks. For various reasons, but particularly because they consider this topic to be very sensitive, they did not want their names to be mentioned in this article. 8
The secular opposition members -most of whom are leftist nationalists or liberals -still tend to dodge the idea of allowing sectarian groups to become political entities. This is due to their conviction that imperialist powers and the regimes of Hafiz and Bashar al-Assad have used sectarianism as a political tool by adopting divide-and-rule policies. Furthermore, coming up with a compromise solution that acknowledged the ruling clique as a potential party in negotiations would be considered a sign of weakness and treason at this moment. Therefore, nobody is willing to take the first step and show acceptance for a compromise solution.
7 Rustum Mahmoud conducted interviews with several military leaders; for a list please see the appendix.
8 Rustum Mahmoud interviewed several intellectuals under the condition of confidentiality in order to learn what is being discussed in internal circles that is not expressed publicly, and about their ideas concerning the future relationship between the communities and the option of a power-sharing arrangement along ethnicsectarian lines.
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There is consensus among the political intellectuals that a model of future rule in Syria must include a ruling party that has broad-based legitimacy among the different communities. These observers agree that the absence of such a party is the largest obstacle to any political proposition, and that such a proposition alone could open the way to addressing the complications of Syria's violent quagmire. The interviewees acknowledged that the blood spilled since the outbreak of the revolution prevents the Alawites from believing in the possibility of co-existence within a state and society where the Sunni majority holds political and military power. Without receiving some kind of self-rule in the regions in which they constitute a majority, the Alawites would not give up their loyalty to the Assad regime.
Most of the intellectuals interviewed for this study agreed that the key factor complicating the Syrian conflict is the desire of the regional powers -namely, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey -to dominate the country. These regional powers are supporting their local proxies with money, weapons, logistical supplies, military training, and diplomatic backing. External financing has greatly influenced the agendas of the Syrian actors, because they have learned to rely on outside support instead of seeking a compromise solution. If Syria is preserved as a territorially united state, a military victory for one side could mean that the regional power supporting the losing side is deprived of its influence within Syria. Thus, their desire to hang onto power inside Syria could drive these external players to accept a compromise.
The Kurds are the group that has publicly proposed some form of power-sharing, since their political institutions are already highly inclusive when it comes to the various communities and because their common national identity is stronger than their sectarian divisions.
The Kurdish politicians we interviewed expressed the most concern about radical Islamist groups. Furthermore, based on bad previous experiences, they would not trust any Arab majority rule. They emphasised that Turkey is the regional power that most stringently refuses the establishment of power-sharing within Syria. Its border areas would be in the immediate vicinity of the areas dominated by the Kurdish and Alawite minorities enjoying cultural and even political autonomy. The centralised Turkish state likely regards this a threat to its national security, as the Syrian example could possibly lead its own minorities, such as the Alevis or the Kurds, to demand similar rights.
The Syrian intellectuals and sociologists stated that future power-sharing arrangements should take place on three levels, which Syrian politicians usually muddle together: At the territorial level, the Alawites would enjoy a special status in the west, the Kurds in the north, and the Druze in the south. Within the legislative councils, the second level, every ethnic and sectarian group would receive a specific quota to prevent any monopolisation of the legislative institutions by the nominal majority. The same quotas would apply for the third level, consisting of executive posts within the various institutions, especially in the army and the security forces.
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The Kurdish Areas and Actors
The three enclaves Efrīn, Kūbānī, and Cezīrê (al-Jazīra) in the north of Syria are called Rojava (Western Kurdistan) by their majority Kurdish inhabitants. The Kurds' territorial compactness, ethnic "otherness" in terms of language and culture, and proto-nationalist identity distinguishes them from other Syrian opposition groups. However, Assyrian Christians, Turkomans, and Arabs, among others, constitute relevant minorities in these territories. Therefore, the Kurdish areas mirror Syria's mosaic structure, and their modelling and practice of powersharing could influence a future political order.
Kurdish Parties
Kurdish parties and militias mostly propose a future Syria that is based on granting the Kurdish regions local self-rule within the Syrian state. However, they do not generalise these propositions for the whole of Syria. Two main branches can be identified from their overall Yet tensions between the two Kurdish branches caused them to follow contrary paths.
When the KNC joined the SNC, the PYD started creating committees with individuals whom the KNC disliked. In Syria's Kurdish region, the PYD adopted a form of federal communalism with democratic self-rule, a concept designed by the leader of the PKK, Abdullah
Öcalan. In September 2013, the PYD unilaterally announced the establishment of administrative and governmental structures and set up an "Interim Committee" in Qāmishlī that was tasked with preparing an administration plan. In November, the PYD announced the creation of a joint interim administration including local and legislative assemblies and govern-GIGA Working Papers 279/2015 ments, and of a general assembly including Kurdish, Arab, Syriac, and Assyrian representatives from all three cantons. In January 2014, autonomy was declared and the first local governments began work in Cezīrê and Kūbānī.
The Kurdish Enclaves of Rojava
Since the end of 2013, the Kurdish PYD has ruled the territory under its control as an auton- However, the text does not go into detail regarding a specific formula for power-sharing among the local communities in the region. Furthermore, the PYD has failed to achieve political consensus on its project, as it was unable to attract major Arab or Assyrian forces. These 
Islamist Actors
Over the course of the violent escalation, the distinctions between the moderate Islamist, Salafist, and jihadist groups have become blurred, as the Syrian battleground remains an arena of constantly shifting methods, allegiances, and targets. This is related to the circle of violence that has radicalised many groups -through external funding from Gulf Arab do- The Nusra Front appears to be slightly more tolerant, as it offers the Muslim sects, basically the Alawite and the Druze, the opportunity to repent and return to "true Islam" if they renounce their "polytheist" (shirk) beliefs and denounce the Assad regime.
Power-Sharing Options for Syria
In this section we evaluate the interests of the Syrian regime and its supporters concerning power-sharing. We then make suggestions based on power-sharing models and experiences from Lebanon, Iraq, and some other existing cases in order to derive lessons for Syria.
The Syrian Regime's Reform Proposals
The There are three potential reasons for the regime's refusal to issue any decree or law supporting a power-sharing arrangement between the Syrian communities:
-Firstly, the Syrian regime may still have believed that it was able to terminate all hostile action by force, or at least to weaken it decisively, and thus that it did not need to offer any concessions.
-Secondly, given the regime's secular Arab nationalist ideology and legitimation strategy, any talk about power-sharing between religious, sectarian, or ethnic communities would undermine its official discourse.
-Finally, a power-sharing agreement that would implement proportional representation or negotiated shares between the communities would seriously undermine the privileged position of the Alawite community and, to a lesser extent, of the Christian and Druze communities.
However, this stubbornness could soon evaporate as the military, economic, and social costs of the war are now becoming too great. The regime is losing territory and the support of the people. In addition, its external supporters, Iran and Russia, may lose patience and confidence in the regime, which they have stood behind for a long time. They may realise that the price of defending the regime -intensifying the Sunna-Shia divide, fuelling Sunni Arab resentment against their countries, international isolation, the threat of jihadi terrorist attacksmay exceed the value of maintaining regional partnerships and alliances. Furthermore, both Russia and Iran have previously and recently proposed power-sharing measures as a possible solution to the Syrian crisis (Malbruno 2012; Rosiny 2013a; Barnard 2015) .
Lessons from the Lebanese and Iraqi Cases
Taking the ethnic, religious, and sectarian composition into consideration, we can compare the Syrian case with the Lebanese and Iraqi cases for similarities and differences, and draw some lessons for a prospective Syrian power-sharing design. The criticism is often made that GIGA Working Papers 279/2015 these countries are not comparable due to their demographic, historical, and political specificities. 9 However, power-sharing has some flexible elements that may be adapted to different local circumstances.
The demographic distribution of communities in Syria is certainly unfavourable for power- To reduce the risks of excluding a huge segment of society, the Iraqi and Lebanese powersharing models have introduced the tripartite separation of key state power: the Maronites, Shiites, and Sunnis in Lebanon and the Shiites, Arab Sunnis, and Kurds in Iraq each hold one of the "three presidencies": the president of the state, the prime minister, and the president of parliament. Even though this arrangement is not part of the constitution in either country, and is instead a gentlemen's agreement, it grants a certain degree of veto power to each community's representatives. Such a political compromise solution could be adopted in Syria as it is already in place within some of the leading institutions of the moderate opposition and the regime.
9 For the differences and similarities between the Syrian and Lebanese experiences see Rosiny (2013a) .
10 "Lā ghālib -lā maghlūb" was the famous formula that ended the Lebanese civil wars of 1958 and 1975-1990 . The Syrian conflict is intricately connected with other regional conflicts that are awaiting a solution. The expansion of radical jihadism in the form of the Islamic State, an escalating regional power struggle between Saudi Arabia and Iran, a revived and intensified SunnaShia divide, and deep frustration within the population due to the failed promises of the Arab Spring are serious challenges that transcend national borders. Syria's power vacuum and the ideological radicalisation of its militias have led to a regional conflagration that threatens many neighbouring countries. This should ideally give rise to the insight among regional powers that power-sharing might be a viable exit strategy (Rosiny 2013b ).
Future Prospects for Power-Sharing in Syria
Syria's popular uprising of 2011 has become a violent civil war between actors who frame the other in heavily ethnic-sectarian terms. The excessive violence has carved the population into Our findings indicate that, in their programmes, the Syrian civil opposition parties have increasingly come to agree on the need to recognise the pluralism of Syrian society. They are increasingly aware of the pertinence of addressing ethnic-sectarian cleavages in the ongoing Syrian crisis. Still, they reject any form of power-sharing that is based on ethnic-sectarian affiliation. However, these statements should be regarded less as political visions for a future Syria and its institutions and more as programmes that are appealing for unity against the current authoritarian rule. Most of these statements were made in the period 2011-2013.
Since then, events have increasingly turned the civil war into one with strong sectarian inclinations. Within this context, the political forces of the opposition have mostly lost their influence over the actual fighters on the ground. Therefore, pragmatic considerations in the direction of a "no victor, no vanquished" compromise solution could become more realistic than rigid principles in order to regain control over the main political agenda.
There has still been no discussion between communal leaders on a formalised and comprehensive power-sharing arrangement. The regulations suggested by the political parties and alliances regarding the granting of cultural rights to minorities may not meet the latter's demands for institutionalised, political guarantees against marginalisation under Arab Sunni majority rule. Furthermore, none of the programmes studied here acknowledges the Alawite community as a separate social group, which may arouse suspicion that addressing and including the other minorities would exclude the Alawites from politics in the future. A widespread discourse of extermination regarding the "Nusairī rāfida" community, which transcends the radical jihadist groups and has reached the mainstream in Syria, feeds this fear.
In this situation of deep mistrust between the communities, an agreed-upon division of power among the different identity communities may be a first step in overcoming the existential fear of being repressed or even exterminated. The formal, agreed-upon sharing of power aims to transform existential enemies into respected opponents, and potentially even into future partners. A power-sharing arrangement would foster ownership among the local stakeholders who have to negotiate the rules. As this paper has shown, such a model is not an alien idea imposed by external powers, but rather one that could build on the moderate opposition's political awareness, has precedents inside Syria, and may profit from different power-sharing experiences in the region.
